| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Shapiro v. Thompson | 394 U.S. 618 (1969) | Established that the right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. |
| Saenz v. Roe | 526 U.S. 489 (1999) | Confirmed the constitutional right to travel between states and receive equal treatment upon arrival. |
| Dunn v. Blumstein | 405 U.S. 330 (1972) | Struck down durational residency requirements for voting, reinforcing the fundamental nature of interstate travel. |
| Edwards v. California | 314 U.S. 160 (1941) | Invalidated a California law restricting migration of indigent persons as a violation of the Commerce Clause and the right to travel. |
| Crandall v. Nevada | 73 U.S. 35 (1868) | Ruled a tax on individuals leaving the state by common carrier unconstitutional, affirming freedom of movement. |
| Jones v. Helms | 452 U.S. 412 (1981) | Held that states can impose penalties on those who flee the state to avoid legal responsibilities, but must respect fundamental travel rights. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Terry v. Ohio | 392 U.S. 1 (1968) | Defined the standard of reasonable suspicion for stops and frisks; emphasized Fourth Amendment protections. |
| Delaware v. Prouse | 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | Declared that random spot checks on drivers without probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. |
| Florida v. Bostick | 501 U.S. 429 (1991) | Reaffirmed that consensual encounters must be truly voluntary under the Fourth Amendment. |
| Whren v. United States | 517 U.S. 806 (1996) | Allowed pretextual stops if the officer had probable cause for any traffic violation. |
| Illinois v. Caballes | 543 U.S. 405 (2005) | Held that a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it does not extend the stop. |
| Rodriguez v. United States | 575 U.S. 348 (2015) | Ruled that extending a traffic stop beyond the time needed for the initial purpose without reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional. |
| Arizona v. Gant | 556 U.S. 332 (2009) | Limited the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest to instances where the arrestee can access the vehicle or evidence related to the offense may be found. |
| Brinegar v. United States | 338 U.S. 160 (1949) | Clarified the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause for arrests and vehicle searches. |
| United States v. Jones | 565 U.S. 400 (2012) | Held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and tracking it constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. |
| Carroll v. United States | 267 U.S. 132 (1925) | Established the automobile exception, allowing warrantless searches of vehicles with probable cause. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Chicago v. Morales | 527 U.S. 41 (1999) | Struck down a city ordinance for being too vague and violating due process rights. |
| Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville | 405 U.S. 156 (1972) | Invalidated vagrancy laws as unconstitutionally vague, reinforcing due process protections. |
| Goldberg v. Kelly | 397 U.S. 254 (1970) | Held that due process requires a hearing before termination of welfare benefits, emphasizing procedural fairness. |
| Yick Wo v. Hopkins | 118 U.S. 356 (1886) | Held that laws applied in a discriminatory manner violate the Equal Protection Clause. |
| Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections | 383 U.S. 663 (1966) | Struck down poll taxes in state elections as violating the Equal Protection Clause. |
| Griffin v. Illinois | 351 U.S. 12 (1956) | Established that equal protection and due process require states to provide trial transcripts to indigent defendants on appeal. |
| Mapp v. Ohio | 367 U.S. 643 (1961) | Incorporated the exclusionary rule to the states, barring illegally obtained evidence from court use. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Miranda v. Arizona | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | Required law enforcement to inform suspects of their rights; landmark ruling against coercive police practices. |
| City of Indianapolis v. Edmond | 531 U.S. 32 (2000) | Ruled that checkpoints set up primarily for general crime control violate the Fourth Amendment. |
| United States v. Brignoni-Ponce | 422 U.S. 873 (1975) | Declared that officers must have reasonable suspicion based on specific facts to justify stopping vehicles. |
| Brown v. Texas | 443 U.S. 47 (1979) | Invalidated a conviction for refusing to identify oneself when there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the individual. |
| Kansas v. Glover | 589 U.S. ___ (2020) | Held that it is reasonable for an officer to suspect the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving, justifying a stop. |
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court | 542 U.S. 177 (2004) | Upheld a statute requiring suspects to identify themselves during a stop if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. |
| Kolender v. Lawson | 461 U.S. 352 (1983) | Struck down a statute that required individuals to provide 'credible and reliable' identification as unconstitutionally vague. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Delaware v. Prouse | 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | Prohibited random traffic stops without reasonable suspicion; relevant to emergency light misuse without cause. |
| Rodriguez v. United States | 575 U.S. 348 (2015) | Extending a stop for reasons unrelated to the original cause—like unnecessary emergency light use—violates the Fourth Amendment. |
| Whren v. United States | 517 U.S. 806 (1996) | Allowed pretextual stops but emphasized that the use of authority must not mask violations of constitutional rights. |
| City of Indianapolis v. Edmond | 531 U.S. 32 (2000) | Checkpoints using emergency lights for general crime control declared unconstitutional. |
| Brown v. Texas | 443 U.S. 47 (1979) | Invalid stop without reasonable suspicion, regardless of emergency signaling. |
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. | 542 U.S. 177 (2004) | Upholds ID requirements only when stops are valid; emergency light use without basis undermines justification. |
| Brendlin v. California | 551 U.S. 249 (2007) | Passengers in vehicles stopped by police are also seized; unlawful light use affects all occupants' rights. |
| Navarette v. California | 572 U.S. 393 (2014) | Anonymous tip justifying stop must show specific suspicion; emergency equipment cannot substitute real evidence. |
| United States v. Arvizu | 534 U.S. 266 (2002) | Reasonable suspicion must be based on totality; misuse of lights unsupported by facts fails scrutiny. |
| Illinois v. Wardlow | 528 U.S. 119 (2000) | Unprovoked flight in high-crime area allows stop; contrast: flashing lights alone in low-risk situations may be abuse. |
| Michigan v. Sitz | 496 U.S. 444 (1990) | Allowed sobriety checkpoints if minimal intrusion; emergency light use beyond those boundaries invalid. |
| Florida v. Royer | 460 U.S. 491 (1983) | Police exceeding scope of stop—including emergency light justification—violates Fourth Amendment. |
| Knowles v. Iowa | 525 U.S. 113 (1998) | Invalidated search incident to citation without arrest; unnecessary emergency lights do not elevate authority. |
| United States v. Martinez-Fuerte | 428 U.S. 543 (1976) | Allowed fixed border stops; distinguishes invalid use of lights for mobile general law enforcement. |
| United States v. Place | 462 U.S. 696 (1983) | Detentions must be brief and justified; flashing emergency lights to prolong seizure violates rights. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Delaware v. Prouse | 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | Held that stopping an automobile and detaining the driver to check their driver's license and registration without reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional. |
| Brown v. Texas | 443 U.S. 47 (1979) | Ruled that detaining a person and demanding identification without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing violates the Fourth Amendment. |
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court | 542 U.S. 177 (2004) | Upheld requiring ID if there is reasonable suspicion of a crime, but not when there is none. |
| Kolender v. Lawson | 461 U.S. 352 (1983) | Struck down a statute requiring identification without clear standards, reaffirming due process rights. |
| Brendlin v. California | 551 U.S. 249 (2007) | Established that all occupants of a vehicle are seized during a traffic stop, and rights apply to passengers too. |
| Knowles v. Iowa | 525 U.S. 113 (1998) | Held that officers cannot search a vehicle without consent or probable cause after issuing a citation. |
| United States v. Ortiz | 422 U.S. 891 (1975) | Declared that searches of vehicles must be based on probable cause or consent, not general suspicion. |
| Florida v. Royer | 460 U.S. 491 (1983) | Police exceeding the scope of an investigative stop—including arrests for failure to show ID—violates the Fourth Amendment. |
| United States v. Mendenhall | 446 U.S. 544 (1980) | Determined that a person is seized only if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave; stops for ID must meet this standard. |
| United States v. Brignoni-Ponce | 422 U.S. 873 (1975) | Invalidated stops based on ethnicity and lack of reasonable suspicion, applicable to arbitrary ID stops. |
| Terry v. Ohio | 392 U.S. 1 (1968) | Defined stop-and-frisk procedures, requiring reasonable suspicion for any detainment or ID demand. |
| Illinois v. Wardlow | 528 U.S. 119 (2000) | Confirmed that flight in a high-crime area can justify a stop, contrasting with passive refusal to show ID. |
| Michigan v. Sitz | 496 U.S. 444 (1990) | Authorized DUI checkpoints with guidelines; does not justify arrest for passive noncompliance like no license plate alone. |
| United States v. Chadwick | 433 U.S. 1 (1977) | Searches incidental to arrest must relate to the arrest itself; lack of ID doesn't justify full arrest/search. |
| United States v. Watson | 423 U.S. 411 (1976) | Arrests require probable cause; failure to show license without other cause may not meet this standard. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Miranda v. Arizona | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | Reinforced the principle that rights must be respected and not coerced or treated as privileges, especially in custodial settings. |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvania | 319 U.S. 105 (1943) | Ruled that a state may not impose a license tax on the right to preach or distribute religious materials, affirming that a right cannot be taxed. |
| Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham | 394 U.S. 147 (1969) | Declared unconstitutional the requirement of a permit for a civil rights demonstration, asserting that rights cannot be licensed. |
| Thomas v. Collins | 323 U.S. 516 (1945) | Invalidated a Texas law requiring union organizers to register, holding that the state cannot convert rights into licensed privileges. |
| Lovell v. City of Griffin | 303 U.S. 444 (1938) | Struck down licensing requirements for religious pamphlets, reaffirming that fundamental rights cannot be licensed. |
| California v. Farley | 98 Cal.App.3d 992 (1979) | While not a U.S. Supreme Court case, it is often cited in liberty arguments. The court acknowledged the principle that the state may not convert a right into a privilege and penalize its exercise with a fine, license, or fee. |
| West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette | 319 U.S. 624 (1943) | Held that compelling actions against conscience violates rights; governmental authority cannot override or commodify rights. |
| Jones v. Opelika | 316 U.S. 584 (1942) | Addressed taxing literature distribution, asserting that the state cannot impose taxes that inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights. |
| Speiser v. Randall | 357 U.S. 513 (1958) | Ruled that denial of tax exemption based on speech violates due process and free speech rights. |
| Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Village of Stratton | 536 U.S. 150 (2002) | Struck down a permit requirement for door-to-door advocacy, protecting unlicensed exercise of free speech. |
| Follett v. Town of McCormick | 321 U.S. 573 (1944) | Invalidated taxes on religious literature, upholding that the First Amendment bars treating a right as taxable. |
| Martin v. City of Struthers | 319 U.S. 141 (1943) | Invalidated a ban on door-to-door distribution of literature, safeguarding rights against transformation into regulated privileges. |
| Lamont v. Postmaster General | 381 U.S. 301 (1965) | Struck down a law requiring recipients of political mail to request delivery, affirming that rights must be freely exercised. |
| Grosjean v. American Press Co. | 297 U.S. 233 (1936) | Struck down discriminatory taxation of newspapers, affirming that rights cannot be burdened through fiscal means. |
| NAACP v. Alabama | 357 U.S. 449 (1958) | Protected the right of association from state interference, emphasizing that rights must not be conditioned on registration or approval. |
| Citizens United v. FEC | 558 U.S. 310 (2010) | Held that restrictions on political expenditures violate First Amendment rights, asserting that government cannot convert free expression into a regulated privilege. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Hale v. Henkel | 201 U.S. 43 (1906) | Differentiated between private individuals and corporations; affirmed that individuals are not subject to the same governmental controls as entities engaged in commerce. |
| United States v. Dewitt | 76 U.S. 41 (1869) | Ruled that the federal government may not regulate intrastate activity by individuals unless clearly engaged in commerce. |
| Miranda v. Arizona | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | Clarified that individuals retain constitutional protections when not engaged in criminal activity or commercial regulation. |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvania | 319 U.S. 105 (1943) | Stated that religious activity, not conducted for profit, is not subject to taxation or licensing, thus distinguishing private action from commerce. |
| Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham | 394 U.S. 147 (1969) | Confirmed that non-commercial, constitutionally protected actions are outside of municipal permit and fee structures. |
| Wheaton v. Peters | 33 U.S. 591 (1834) | Affirmed that Congress cannot create monopolies in the name of regulation except in clear commercial contexts. |
| United States v. Lopez | 514 U.S. 549 (1995) | Limited the reach of the Commerce Clause, stating that not all activity can be federally regulated as commerce. |
| United States v. Morrison | 529 U.S. 598 (2000) | Reinforced Lopez, ruling that the Commerce Clause does not apply to non-economic, private conduct. |
| City of Chicago v. Morales | 527 U.S. 41 (1999) | Protected individual liberty in public movement, distinguishing it from commercial activity subject to regulation. |
| California v. Ciraolo | 476 U.S. 207 (1986) | Discussed privacy expectations in non-commercial settings, underscoring distinctions from business regulations. |
| Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville | 405 U.S. 156 (1972) | Struck down vagrancy laws that penalized private movement not tied to commercial conduct. |
| Marbury v. Madison | 5 U.S. 137 (1803) | Established judicial review, reaffirming that government has no power to convert private rights into regulated privileges without clear authority. |
| Warden v. Hayden | 387 U.S. 294 (1967) | Affirmed that constitutional protections apply equally to non-commercial, private citizens. |
| Boyd v. United States | 116 U.S. 616 (1886) | Declared that compelling disclosure of private papers was unconstitutional, especially when unrelated to commercial fraud. |
| United States v. Constantine | 296 U.S. 287 (1935) | Held that states may not convert a right into a privilege simply because an activity is mistakenly presumed commercial. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago | 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22 (1929) | Established that the right of individuals to travel freely is a liberty protected by the 14th Amendment and not subject to arbitrary licensing. |
| Thompson v. Smith | 154 S.E. 579 (Va. 1930) | Ruled that the right to travel upon public highways is not a mere privilege but a fundamental right, and a city cannot revoke it arbitrarily. |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvania | 319 U.S. 105 (1943) | Held that a state may not impose a license tax on the exercise of a constitutional right, reinforcing travel as a right, not a taxable privilege. |
| Shapiro v. Thompson | 394 U.S. 618 (1969) | Confirmed that the constitutional right to travel between states is fundamental and may not be burdened by government requirements. |
| Kent v. Dulles | 357 U.S. 116 (1958) | Established that the right to travel is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. |
| Crandall v. Nevada | 73 U.S. 35 (1867) | Invalidated state-imposed travel fees, affirming that free movement between states is a protected right. |
| United States v. Guest | 383 U.S. 745 (1966) | Ruled that interfering with the constitutional right to travel violates federal protections. |
| Edwards v. California | 314 U.S. 160 (1941) | Held that states cannot restrict free travel of individuals across state lines, particularly the indigent. |
| Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville | 405 U.S. 156 (1972) | Struck down a vague vagrancy law, affirming that arbitrary restrictions on movement and travel are unconstitutional. |
| Berger v. New York | 388 U.S. 41 (1967) | Found that government surveillance without probable cause violates rights to privacy, supporting freedom of movement. |
| Miranda v. Arizona | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | Though a criminal case, it reinforced protections against compelled compliance with government demands without due process. |
| Boyd v. United States | 116 U.S. 616 (1886) | Affirmed strong protections against government intrusion into private affairs, including travel without state interference. |
| Hertado v. California | 110 U.S. 516 (1884) | Emphasized due process as a safeguard against arbitrary state restrictions on liberty, including travel rights. |
| United States v. Wheeler | 254 U.S. 281 (1920) | Declared that the right to free movement from one state to another is a constitutional guarantee. |
| Marbury v. Madison | 5 U.S. 137 (1803) | Established that unconstitutional laws—including those restricting rights like travel—are null and void. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Thompson v. Smith | 154 S.E. 579 (Va. 1930) | Stated that the right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon is a common right and not a privilege that can be taken arbitrarily. |
| Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago | 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22 (1929) | Recognized that the right to travel is a liberty that cannot be infringed upon by licensing or registration requirements. |
| Hale v. Henkel | 201 U.S. 43 (1906) | Distinguished between the powers of the government over corporations versus private individuals, implying private actions like travel are not subject to commercial regulations. |
| Murdoch v. Pennsylvania | 319 U.S. 105 (1943) | Declared unconstitutional any license tax on the right to exercise fundamental liberties such as travel. |
| Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham | 394 U.S. 147 (1969) | Held that requiring a permit to exercise constitutional rights is an unconstitutional prior restraint. |
| Crandall v. Nevada | 73 U.S. 35 (1867) | Ruled that states cannot impose a tax or burden on a person for traveling from one state to another. |
| Kent v. Dulles | 357 U.S. 116 (1958) | Asserted that the right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process. |
| United States v. Guest | 383 U.S. 745 (1966) | Confirmed that constitutional protections apply to travel and that interference may invoke constitutional scrutiny. |
| Edwards v. California | 314 U.S. 160 (1941) | Reinforced the right of individuals to move freely across state lines, without state-imposed burdens. |
| Berberian v. Lussier | 341 F. Supp. 999 (D.R.I. 1972) | Not a Supreme Court case but often cited for the principle that personal travel does not require state permission unless engaged in commerce. |
| United States v. Constantine | 296 U.S. 287 (1935) | Confirmed that states cannot enforce regulatory measures upon non-commercial individuals under the guise of taxation or public safety. |
| City of Chicago v. Morales | 527 U.S. 41 (1999) | Found laws restricting movement without a legitimate basis unconstitutional, supporting the broader liberty to move unimpeded. |
| Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville | 405 U.S. 156 (1972) | Invalidated vague statutes used to criminalize free movement, reinforcing the concept of protected travel. |
| Boyd v. United States | 116 U.S. 616 (1886) | Asserted that private property and activity, such as travel, is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. |
| Marbury v. Madison | 5 U.S. 137 (1803) | Established the principle that unconstitutional laws—such as those converting rights into licensed privileges—are void. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Ex parte Yarbrough | 110 U.S. 651 (1884) | Held that the federal government has a duty to protect constitutional rights—including travel—against infringement by any actor, public or private. |
| Twining v. New Jersey | 211 U.S. 78 (1908) | While ultimately limited, it acknowledged that certain rights, including movement, might be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. |
| United States v. Wheeler | 254 U.S. 281 (1920) | Reiterated that freedom of movement among states is a right of national citizenship. |
| Reid v. Covert | 354 U.S. 1 (1957) | Held that no agreement or treaty may override constitutional protections, including liberty rights such as travel. |
| Stanley v. Georgia | 394 U.S. 557 (1969) | While centered on privacy in one’s home, it reinforces the right to be free from state intrusion into personal liberty and property—applicable to private travel. |
| Yick Wo v. Hopkins | 118 U.S. 356 (1886) | Struck down arbitrary enforcement of laws against certain people, establishing that laws must be applied equally—key in defending unlicensed private travel. |
| Truax v. Raich | 239 U.S. 33 (1915) | Affirmed that liberty includes the right to live and move freely, which cannot be obstructed without due process. |
| Griswold v. Connecticut | 381 U.S. 479 (1965) | Established a right to personal privacy, indirectly supporting the freedom to travel without state interference. |
| Doe v. Bolton | 410 U.S. 179 (1973) | While primarily about medical choice, it clarified that personal liberty is broad and includes decision-making about movement. |
| Meyer v. Nebraska | 262 U.S. 390 (1923) | Ruled that liberty includes the right to acquire knowledge and engage in customary pursuits, which includes the right to travel freely. |
| Palko v. Connecticut | 302 U.S. 319 (1937) | Identified fundamental rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, including those necessary for liberty like free movement. |
| Moore v. East Cleveland | 431 U.S. 494 (1977) | Reaffirmed the broad liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, including family and private autonomy in movement and association. |
| Saenz v. Roe | 526 U.S. 489 (1999) | Affirmed that the right to travel is fundamental and that states cannot penalize newcomers, reinforcing interstate travel rights. |
| Monell v. Dept. of Social Services | 436 U.S. 658 (1978) | Allowed municipalities to be sued for violating constitutional rights, including unlawful enforcement of travel regulations. |
| Bond v. United States | 572 U.S. 844 (2014) | Held that individuals can challenge federal power under the Tenth Amendment when rights such as liberty or movement are affected. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Coffin v. United States | 156 U.S. 432 (1895) | Established the presumption of innocence as a fundamental principle of U.S. law; the burden is always on the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| In re Winship | 397 U.S. 358 (1970) | Held that the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, including allegations stemming from traffic-related encounters. |
| Mullaney v. Wilbur | 421 U.S. 684 (1975) | Ruled that states cannot shift the burden of proof to the defendant to prove innocence or justification once the government initiates an accusation. |
| Sandstrom v. Montana | 442 U.S. 510 (1979) | Struck down jury instructions that presumed a defendant’s intent, reaffirming that presumptions against the accused violate due process. |
| Speiser v. Randall | 357 U.S. 513 (1958) | Held that the government cannot place the burden on the individual to prove eligibility for a constitutional right—travel included. |
| Morissette v. United States | 342 U.S. 246 (1952) | Confirmed that criminal offenses require both act and intent, and that the state must prove both beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Estelle v. Williams | 425 U.S. 501 (1976) | Prohibited presenting defendants in a way that suggests guilt (e.g., in prison attire), reinforcing the presumption of innocence in legal proceedings. |
| Taylor v. Kentucky | 436 U.S. 478 (1978) | Held that failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence undermined due process rights. |
| Patterson v. New York | 432 U.S. 197 (1977) | Recognized limits on burden shifting but maintained that core elements of any crime must be proven by the prosecution. |
| Carey v. Piphus | 435 U.S. 247 (1978) | Reinforced that due process must be upheld before government imposes penalties or deprivations—relevant to administrative fines from stops. |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey | 530 U.S. 466 (2000) | Held that any fact increasing a penalty must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt—applicable to traffic fines escalating to criminal charges. |
| McMillan v. Pennsylvania | 477 U.S. 79 (1986) | Clarified that sentencing factors must not be used to bypass proof burdens; all criminal assertions require proper procedural standards. |
| United States v. Booker | 543 U.S. 220 (2005) | Struck down mandatory sentencing guidelines that shifted burden from state to accused, reaffirming constitutional protections in legal findings. |
| Alleyne v. United States | 570 U.S. 99 (2013) | Extended Apprendi’s logic, holding that any factor increasing a mandatory minimum sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| United States v. Gouveia | 467 U.S. 180 (1984) | Confirmed that constitutional protections apply from the moment the government acts in an accusatory fashion—relevant when police initiate a stop without cause. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Monroe v. Pape | 365 U.S. 167 (1961) | Held that individuals can sue police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations, even if the misconduct was unauthorized by the state. |
| Harlow v. Fitzgerald | 457 U.S. 800 (1982) | Defined qualified immunity as protection for officers unless they violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights. |
| Hope v. Pelzer | 536 U.S. 730 (2002) | Denied qualified immunity when officers' actions were clearly unconstitutional, even if not previously addressed in identical terms. |
| Taylor v. Riojas | 592 U.S. ___ (2020) | Ruled that qualified immunity does not shield obviously unconstitutional conditions, such as inhumane treatment or false arrest. |
| Graham v. Connor | 490 U.S. 386 (1989) | Established that excessive force claims must be judged by an objective standard under the Fourth Amendment, not subjective intent. |
| Saucier v. Katz | 533 U.S. 194 (2001) | Introduced a two-step analysis for qualified immunity: was a constitutional right violated, and was that right clearly established? |
| Anderson v. Creighton | 483 U.S. 635 (1987) | Reinforced that the unlawfulness of an action must be apparent in light of pre-existing law for immunity to be denied. |
| Pierson v. Ray | 386 U.S. 547 (1967) | First recognized qualified immunity for police officers under certain circumstances, but allowed liability when rights are clearly violated. |
| City of Canton v. Harris | 489 U.S. 378 (1989) | Held municipalities liable for failure to train police if the lack of training causes constitutional violations. |
| Connick v. Thompson | 563 U.S. 51 (2011) | Limited municipal liability but affirmed that repeated official misconduct can rise to the level of actionable negligence. |
| Owen v. City of Independence | 445 U.S. 622 (1980) | Held that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under Section 1983. |
| Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents | 403 U.S. 388 (1971) | Authorized individuals to sue federal officers for constitutional violations, setting a foundation for accountability beyond state officers. |
| Wilson v. Layne | 526 U.S. 603 (1999) | Ruled that officers violated the Fourth Amendment by bringing media into a home during a warrant execution; denied immunity due to clear violation. |
| Malley v. Briggs | 475 U.S. 335 (1986) | Held that officers can be liable for presenting false information to obtain a warrant, affirming that qualified immunity is not absolute. |
| Ziglar v. Abbasi | 582 U.S. ___ (2017) | Limited the scope of Bivens but confirmed that federal officers may still be accountable in exceptional circumstances. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Brigham City v. Stuart | 547 U.S. 398 (2006) | Held that police may enter a home without a warrant if there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with injury. |
| Michigan v. Fisher | 558 U.S. 45 (2009) | Reiterated that emergency aid exception permits warrantless entry when officers reasonably believe someone needs medical assistance. |
| Missouri v. McNeely | 569 U.S. 141 (2013) | Declared that the natural dissipation of alcohol does not automatically justify a warrantless blood draw; emergencies must be case-specific. |
| Kentucky v. King | 563 U.S. 452 (2011) | Held that police-created exigencies do not justify warrantless searches unless their conduct was lawful and not an attempt to evade the Fourth Amendment. |
| Warden v. Hayden | 387 U.S. 294 (1967) | Upheld warrantless entry during a hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; established exigent circumstances tied to immediate danger or escape risk. |
| Welsh v. Wisconsin | 466 U.S. 740 (1984) | Held that warrantless home entry to arrest a person for a minor offense (e.g., DUI) violates the Fourth Amendment; gravity of offense is critical. |
| Mincey v. Arizona | 437 U.S. 385 (1978) | Ruled that there is no “murder scene exception” to the warrant requirement—emergencies must be real and immediate, not speculative. |
| Georgia v. Randolph | 547 U.S. 103 (2006) | Warrantless entry based on one resident’s consent is invalid when another resident is present and objects—no exigency presumed. |
| Flippo v. West Virginia | 528 U.S. 11 (1999) | Summarily held that a warrantless search of a crime scene violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances. |
| Caniglia v. Strom | 593 U.S. ___ (2021) | Struck down “community caretaking” exception for warrantless home entry unrelated to ongoing emergencies. |
| Illinois v. McArthur | 531 U.S. 326 (2001) | Upheld brief seizure of home while officers sought a warrant, but emphasized limited scope and specific justification needed. |
| Payton v. New York | 445 U.S. 573 (1980) | Established that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless home entry for routine felony arrests absent exigent circumstances. |
| City of Indianapolis v. Edmond | 531 U.S. 32 (2000) | Rejected suspicionless checkpoints absent an immediate public danger or emergency—critical in distinguishing travel enforcement from real emergencies. |
| United States v. Santana | 427 U.S. 38 (1976) | Recognized hot pursuit as an exigent circumstance but limited its application to serious offenses and real flight risk. |
| United States v. Place | 462 U.S. 696 (1983) | Held that even temporary seizures must be reasonable and proportionate to their justification—“emergency” cannot be a blanket excuse. |
| Delaware v. Prouse | 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | Held that random stops of vehicles without reasonable suspicion are unconstitutional; officers cannot claim a generalized “emergency” as justification for vehicle stops. |
| Brendlin v. California | 551 U.S. 249 (2007) | Confirmed that all occupants of a vehicle are "seized" during a traffic stop, and the stop must be justified by articulable facts, not vague emergency claims. |
| Knowles v. Iowa | 525 U.S. 113 (1998) | Ruled that officers cannot conduct a full vehicle search after a citation unless there is probable cause or an actual emergency situation, preventing misuse of authority. |
| Arizona v. Gant | 556 U.S. 332 (2009) | Limited warrantless vehicle searches to instances of actual threat or evidence preservation—officers cannot use “traffic stop” as pretext for emergency-based searches. |
| Rodriguez v. United States | 575 U.S. 348 (2015) | Ruled that extending a traffic stop beyond its original purpose (e.g., using emergency lights for pretextual stops) without consent or cause violates the Fourth Amendment. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Allgeyer v. Louisiana | 165 U.S. 578 (1897) | Established that the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment includes the right to enter into private contracts without state interference. |
| Fuentes v. Shevin | 407 U.S. 67 (1972) | Ruled that due process is violated when the government takes property without a prior hearing; relevant to seizure of private vehicles under presumed consent. |
| Lanzetta v. New Jersey | 306 U.S. 451 (1939) | Held that vague laws cannot establish jurisdiction or impose penalties, especially where individuals have not consented to regulation. |
| Ward v. Village of Monroeville | 409 U.S. 57 (1972) | Determined that financial interest by a court in the outcome of cases invalidates jurisdiction—relevant to revenue-based traffic enforcement. |
| Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States | 318 U.S. 363 (1943) | Established that governments descend to the level of private corporations in commercial matters and must be held to the same standards—critical in travel licensing schemes. |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvania | 319 U.S. 105 (1943) | Held that fundamental rights cannot be conditioned on licenses, which are contracts of privilege—not natural rights. |
| Marbury v. Madison | 5 U.S. 137 (1803) | Established that all laws contrary to the Constitution are void, and no contract or policy can override constitutional protections. |
| United States v. Cruikshank | 92 U.S. 542 (1876) | Clarified that rights preexist government and are not granted by it, thus cannot be conditioned on consent or jurisdiction absent due process. |
| Norton v. Shelby County | 118 U.S. 425 (1886) | Stated that unconstitutional acts are not law and confer no rights or authority, especially over sovereign individuals. |
| Miranda v. Arizona | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | Defined the necessity of informed, voluntary consent when dealing with authority—critical in disputing assumed jurisdiction during travel stops. |
| Bond v. United States | 564 U.S. 211 (2011) | Reaffirmed the individual’s right to challenge the federal government under the Tenth Amendment when overreach occurs, including travel restrictions. |
| Yick Wo v. Hopkins | 118 U.S. 356 (1886) | Held that laws applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner are invalid, particularly when consent is presumed but not given. |
| Davis v. Wechsler | 263 U.S. 22 (1923) | Ruled that state procedural rules cannot be used to defeat federal rights, such as unlicensed private travel protected by liberty clauses. |
| Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad | 240 U.S. 1 (1916) | Emphasized that federal taxation and jurisdiction are limited by constitutional boundaries—not personal contracts or assumed agreements. |
| Slaughter-House Cases | 83 U.S. 36 (1873) | Distinguished between federal and state citizenship, but affirmed protection of privileges and immunities—relevant in protecting travel rights from state control. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Jacobson v. Massachusetts | 197 U.S. 11 (1905) | Defined police power as limited to public health, safety, and welfare—but affirmed it cannot arbitrarily override individual liberty without necessity and due process. |
| Lochner v. New York | 198 U.S. 45 (1905) | Struck down a state law under the Due Process Clause, ruling that police power cannot infringe upon liberty or private contract rights without substantial justification. |
| Lawton v. Steele | 152 U.S. 133 (1894) | Ruled that police powers must be exercised within constitutional bounds and cannot destroy rights under the guise of regulation. |
| Mugler v. Kansas | 123 U.S. 623 (1887) | Held that police power does not justify laws that are arbitrary or oppressive and must serve a legitimate public interest. |
| Railroad Commission Cases | 116 U.S. 307 (1886) | Affirmed that state regulation must respect constitutional protections and cannot interfere with liberty without clear necessity. |
| City of Chicago v. Morales | 527 U.S. 41 (1999) | Invalidated a loitering ordinance as vague and arbitrary, emphasizing that police power cannot criminalize lawful presence or travel without due process. |
| United States v. Guest | 383 U.S. 745 (1966) | Confirmed that interference with the right to travel invokes federal protection, and state action under police power must respect constitutional limits. |
| Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville | 405 U.S. 156 (1972) | Struck down a vagrancy law as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory, reinforcing limits on arbitrary police enforcement. |
| Edwards v. California | 314 U.S. 160 (1941) | Overturned a law restricting movement of the indigent, stating that states cannot use police power to restrict interstate travel. |
| Saenz v. Roe | 526 U.S. 489 (1999) | Held that states cannot penalize new residents through reduced benefits, reaffirming that travel and residency are protected from intrusive police powers. |
| Kent v. Dulles | 357 U.S. 116 (1958) | Affirmed that travel is a part of the liberty guaranteed under the Constitution, and government authority must respect that right unless justified by due process. |
| Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners | 353 U.S. 232 (1957) | Held that states cannot deny rights or licenses based on arbitrary standards; reinforces limits on state-imposed conditions on individual liberty. |
| Meyer v. Nebraska | 262 U.S. 390 (1923) | Struck down a law banning foreign-language instruction, stating that liberty includes personal and familial autonomy outside police regulation. |
| Pierce v. Society of Sisters | 268 U.S. 510 (1925) | Limited state power to mandate public schooling, reaffirming that liberty protects private choices against state interference. |
| Planned Parenthood v. Casey | 505 U.S. 833 (1992) | Though primarily about medical autonomy, it reasserted that states may not impose undue burdens on personal liberty—key in resisting excessive travel regulation. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Terry v. Ohio | 392 U.S. 1 (1968) | Established the “reasonable suspicion” standard: officers must point to specific and articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot to justify a stop. |
| Delaware v. Prouse | 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | Held that officers must have articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle; random stops to check licenses or registration are unconstitutional. |
| United States v. Sokolow | 490 U.S. 1 (1989) | Clarified that reasonable suspicion can be based on the totality of the circumstances, but must be grounded in objective, articulable facts. |
| Brown v. Texas | 443 U.S. 47 (1979) | Invalidated a stop where the officer lacked any specific, articulable reason to detain an individual, affirming that mere presence is not enough. |
| Florida v. Royer | 460 U.S. 491 (1983) | Held that law enforcement cannot expand a stop beyond its original justification without additional specific suspicion. |
| United States v. Arvizu | 534 U.S. 266 (2002) | Affirmed that reasonable suspicion must be based on the officer’s objective interpretation of behavior and not on inarticulable hunches. |
| Illinois v. Wardlow | 528 U.S. 119 (2000) | Held that sudden flight in a high-crime area can be a factor in reasonable suspicion, but must still be part of an articulable justification. |
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court | 542 U.S. 177 (2004) | Permitted an officer to demand identification only when there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—mere refusal is not sufficient cause for arrest. |
| Navarette v. California | 572 U.S. 393 (2014) | Held that anonymous tips can support a stop if they are corroborated with specific, articulable facts and reliable indicators of a crime. |
| United States v. Cortez | 449 U.S. 411 (1981) | Emphasized that RAS must be based on the totality of circumstances and must include a particularized and objective basis for suspicion. |
| Rodriguez v. United States | 575 U.S. 348 (2015) | Held that officers may not prolong a traffic stop beyond the time needed to handle the reason for the stop unless they develop additional RAS. |
| Brendlin v. California | 551 U.S. 249 (2007) | Held that all occupants of a vehicle are “seized” in a stop, and the stop must be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion applicable to all present. |
| United States v. Mendenhall | 446 U.S. 544 (1980) | Determined that a seizure occurs if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave—officers must justify the stop with at least one articulable fact. |
| Whren v. United States | 517 U.S. 806 (1996) | Allowed pretextual stops if a traffic law violation occurred, but emphasized that the officer must still point to an objective basis, not generalized suspicion. |
| United States v. Martinez-Fuerte | 428 U.S. 543 (1976) | Allowed immigration checkpoints but limited scope—specific suspicion still required for secondary questioning, especially outside designated checkpoint contexts. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Monroe v. Pape | 365 U.S. 167 (1961) | Found that police officers who acted under "color of law" but violated constitutional rights could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case enabled financial recovery—including through liability insurance or surety mechanisms—for misconduct. |
| Owen v. City of Independence | 445 U.S. 622 (1980) | Held that municipalities have no qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. A person injured by unconstitutional acts could seek damages—potentially triggering municipal bonds or insurance coverage of liable officials. |
| Harlow v. Fitzgerald | 457 U.S. 800 (1982) | Established the qualified immunity test, but confirmed that when immunity is pierced, public officials (like sheriffs) may be personally liable, opening the door to surety bond claims where states require such bonding. |
| Filarsky v. Delia | 566 U.S. 377 (2012) | Confirmed that private individuals temporarily retained by the government (including bonded officers or contractors) can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Supports theories where performance bonds are triggered by rights violations. |
| West v. Atkins | 487 U.S. 42 (1988) | Ruled that even contracted personnel acting under state authority could be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Reinforces that constitutional liability isn't restricted to full-time officers, strengthening the scope of surety accountability. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Delaware v. Prouse | 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | Ruled that stopping vehicles without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment. A foundational case used in lawsuits where officers' actions during traffic stops led to civil liability and bond claims. |
| Brendlin v. California | 551 U.S. 249 (2007) | Established that all occupants of a vehicle are “seized” during a stop, and unlawful stops open the door to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which can trigger surety claims against the involved officers. |
| Brower v. County of Inyo | 489 U.S. 593 (1989) | Held that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when police used a roadblock to stop a suspect, emphasizing that unreasonable seizures during travel are constitutionally actionable. |
| Rodriguez v. United States | 575 U.S. 348 (2015) | Found that extending a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose without reasonable suspicion is unlawful. Successful claims under this precedent have led to judgments and potential surety recovery. |
| Monroe v. Pape | 365 U.S. 167 (1961) | Allowed citizens to sue police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations. Many claims stemming from unlawful travel-related detentions have used this case to pursue damages from the officer’s surety bond. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Delaware v. Prouse | 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | Ruled that stopping and detaining a motorist without reasonable suspicion, merely to check license or registration, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Cited in successful § 1983 claims against officers and municipalities. |
| Brown v. Texas | 443 U.S. 47 (1979) | Held that police cannot detain an individual and demand ID without specific, articulable suspicion. Used in cases involving arrests for refusal to show driver’s licenses during non-commercial travel. |
| Kolender v. Lawson | 461 U.S. 352 (1983) | Struck down a statute requiring “credible and reliable” ID as unconstitutionally vague. Reinforced the principle that people cannot be arrested simply for lacking state-issued ID or papers. |
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court | 542 U.S. 177 (2004) | Upheld stop-and-identify statutes only when based on reasonable suspicion. Arresting someone during private travel without that threshold violates rights and can support bond-related liability. |
| Knowles v. Iowa | 525 U.S. 113 (1998) | Held that issuing a citation for a minor traffic offense (such as registration) does not justify a search or detention. Arrests or extended stops in these contexts can trigger constitutional claims and monetary damages. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Yick Wo v. Hopkins | 118 U.S. 356 (1886) | Declared that sovereignty remains with the people and that government exists to serve them. The Court stated, “Sovereignty itself is not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law… Sovereignty itself remains with the people.” |
| Chisholm v. Georgia | 2 U.S. 419 (1793) | Early affirmation that the people are sovereign and the states themselves are not sovereign over the people. “The people, not the states, are sovereign.” |
| Bond v. United States | 564 U.S. 211 (2011) | Confirmed that individuals—not just states—may challenge federal overreach. Reinforced that the Constitution exists to protect personal liberty against both federal and state encroachment. |
| Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee | 14 U.S. 304 (1816) | Declared that the Constitution was established by the people, not the states, and that the federal judiciary is supreme over state interpretations when rights of the people are at stake. |
| U.S. v. Lee | 106 U.S. 196 (1882) | Held that no government officer is above the law, affirming that individuals may hold federal agents personally liable for constitutional violations. Government must act within limits set by the people. |
| Marbury v. Madison | 5 U.S. 137 (1803) | Established the principle of judicial review and confirmed that the Constitution, as a manifestation of the people’s will, is the supreme law. Government acts are void if they exceed constitutional limits set by the sovereign people. |
| Cohens v. Virginia | 19 U.S. 264 (1821) | Reinforced that the federal government derives its authority from the people—not the states—and that federal courts may protect individual rights against state encroachment. |
| Texas v. White | 74 U.S. 700 (1869) | Held that the Union is indestructible and that sovereignty rests not in the states but in the people of the United States collectively, who formed the federal government. |
| Gibbons v. Ogden | 22 U.S. 1 (1824) | Confirmed that federal power, while supreme in its sphere, is limited to that which is expressly delegated by the people through the Constitution. |
| U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton | 514 U.S. 779 (1995) | Held that states cannot impose additional qualifications on federal officeholders beyond those in the Constitution, emphasizing that ultimate authority rests with the people, not the states or their agents. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Timbs v. Indiana |
586 U.S. 146 (2019) |
Held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states, protecting against using traffic-related fines as unconstitutional revenue tools. |
| Bearden v. Georgia |
461 U.S. 660 (1983) |
Ruled it unconstitutional to punish individuals with incarceration or extended penalties simply because they are too poor to pay fines, including traffic citations. |
| Perez v. Campbell |
402 U.S. 637 (1971) |
Invalidated a state law suspending driver's licenses for unpaid debts from traffic accidents, emphasizing that economic penalties can't undermine constitutional protections. |
| Austin v. United States |
509 U.S. 602 (1993) |
Determined that civil fines and forfeitures, including traffic-related ones, are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. |
| United States v. Bajakajian |
524 U.S. 321 (1998) |
Held that disproportionate fines—like large seizures for minor offenses—violate the Eighth Amendment. This principle applies to inflated traffic penalties. |
| Ward v. Village of Monroeville |
409 U.S. 57 (1972) |
Found it unconstitutional for traffic court judges to rule in cases where the fines contribute to their municipal budgets. Conflicts of interest undermine due process. |
| Tumey v. Ohio |
273 U.S. 510 (1927) |
Ruled that judicial officers cannot have a financial interest in case outcomes—key in traffic courts where fines are used for city revenue. |
| Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. |
446 U.S. 238 (1980) |
Held that enforcement agencies must remain neutral and cannot be financially incentivized to punish; revenue-generation schemes violate this standard. |
| Harmelin v. Michigan |
501 U.S. 957 (1991) |
Affirmed that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality principle that applies to fines and punishments, including those arising from traffic violations. |
| Brown v. Edwards |
721 F.2d 1442 (5th Cir. 1984) |
Although not a SCOTUS case, it demonstrated that systems paying officers per conviction encourage unconstitutional policing for profit. Cited in arguments against revenue-driven enforcement. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| Delaware v. Prouse |
440 U.S. 648 (1979) |
Ruled that discretionary traffic stops without reasonable suspicion are unconstitutional. Officers who stop vehicles solely to check licenses act under color of law without lawful authority. |
| Rodriguez v. United States |
575 U.S. 348 (2015) |
Held that extending a traffic stop beyond its original purpose without articulable suspicion is an abuse of power under color of law and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. |
| Brendlin v. California |
551 U.S. 249 (2007) |
Confirmed that passengers, not just drivers, are seized during traffic stops and can challenge unconstitutional conduct by officers acting under color of law. |
| Brower v. County of Inyo |
489 U.S. 593 (1989) |
Ruled that using state power in a way that intentionally causes harm (e.g., roadblock ambush) is state action under color of law and subject to constitutional limits. |
| Monroe v. Pape |
365 U.S. 167 (1961) |
Established that law enforcement officers can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they act under color of law in a way that violates constitutional rights—including during illegal stops and arrests. |
| Case Name | Citation | Summary |
|---|
| United States v. Williams |
504 U.S. 36 (1992) |
Held that federal courts have no authority to require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Affirmed that the grand jury is an independent constitutional institution rooted in the Fifth Amendment. |
| Hale v. Henkel |
201 U.S. 43 (1906) |
Recognized the authority of a grand jury to investigate independently of judicial or prosecutorial direction. Reaffirmed individual constitutional protections during compulsory investigations. |
| Stirone v. United States |
361 U.S. 212 (1960) |
Held that a defendant can only be tried on charges brought by a grand jury, reinforcing its exclusive charging function and constitutional role as a safeguard against arbitrary prosecution. |
| Costello v. United States |
350 U.S. 359 (1956) |
While allowing hearsay before grand juries, the Court emphasized their historical and independent role in determining probable cause, separate from judicial interference. |
| United States v. Calandra |
414 U.S. 338 (1974) |
Held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings. Reinforced the grand jury's broad investigatory powers and independence from judicial limitations during pre-trial stages. |